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## BATTLE OF FROME.

TO

MR. R. B. THORNHILL,

CAPT. AND ADJ. NORTH SOM. YEOMANRY  
CAVALRY.

Botley, July 27, 1816,

SIR,

When I addressed my former letter to you, I was not aware, that the *COURIER* had made use of the word "*repulsed*," as applied to the resistance which the Yeomanry at Frome met with from the people there. I proved, indeed, that the narrative of the affair clearly showed, that the Yeomanry had been *repulsed*. I showed, that what had taken place amounted to a *repulse*; but, I was not then aware, that the *very word* had been used. Now, however, having had an opportunity of examining the *COURIER*, I find that paper, of the *first of July*, speaks of the matter in the following words:—"At Frome an immense mob assembled and **REPULSED** the *Yeomanry Cavalry*, wounding the commanding officer and two or three others, but were, at last, dispersed by them and a party of the *In-niskillen Dragoons*."

Now, Sir, this appeared in the *Courier* of the *first of July*, and you take no notice of it, till after the same has appeared in the *Register* of the *sixth of July*. Then it is, and not till then, that your deep sense of duty to the Yeomanry is awakened! That you read the account in the *Courier* who can doubt, since you

choose that paper as the vehicle of your spiteful attack upon me. It is not to be believed, that you had not read this account in the *Courier*. Besides, it had been published in the papers of your own city, and in nearly all the newspapers in England. What, then, but malice, or vanity, or the still worse motive of ingratiating yourself with people in power and of obtaining profit thereby, could have induced you to assail me as the *author*, as the *originater*, of a statement, which, as you affected to regard it, was injurious to the character of the Yeomanry?

Your conduct appears to me to be as base as it is possible for conduct to be. First you read, in the other newspapers, an account of the *repulse* in question. A week afterwards you read the *same* account in the *Register*, with this exception, that the other papers stated the fact *positively*, whereas I stated it as it had *appeared*. Upon this you fly at me like a cur, though you had been totally silent before; you send your letter, though addressed to me, to a paper in which you well know my answer never would appear. You represent me as the *originater* of the statement, though I used words to show that I merely gave it as before given. And, which could have proceeded from nothing short of the very soul of baseness, you *misquote* my words, in order to cause it to be believed, that the whole story had been hatched by me. Upon the strength of this falsification of my words, you accuse me of *falsehood*. And all this you have the hypocrisy to pretend you did from a *sense of your duty* as Adjutant of a corps of Yeomanry! Verily, if the honour of the corps be committed to your guardianship, it is in a most perilous condition.

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I have seen your letter to Mr. ALLEN, and it is quite worthy of you. It has been called forth by that gentleman's letter to me; and your *answer* to it consists *wholly* of *personal abuse* of Mr. ALLEN. Not a word in contradiction of the statement in his letter; but *abuse solely*; except, indeed, that there is gross *falsehood* in your saying, that he *abused* the *Inhabitants of Frome* and the *Yeomanry Cavalry*, when, really, he paid compliments to both; and only observed of you, that, with all your *boasting*, you did not arrive in the town *till all was quiet*.

Never, certainly, did *ignorance* more completely counteract *malice* than in your case. There *may* be a few of the corps, of which you are Adjutant, as malicious and empty as yourself; but, I am of opinion, that your conduct will be disavowed by a great majority of that body, who never can wish to pass for an association of men of whom you are a sample. An empty boaster, a Pistol, a Bardolph, a Bobadil, these are the reverse of the real *soldier*, who is always modest in his language, and who would rather be flayed alive than publish to the world the heroic deeds that he *has* performed, much less those which he *intends* to perform, or is *able* to perform.

The manifest *delight* which you express at the prospect of making war upon a defenceless multitude is, in the highest degree, shameful. At the very least, *sorrow* for the necessity of military interference ought to pervade the Yeomanry ranks; and, notwithstanding you have represented yourself as the organ of your corps, I cannot help believing, that such is the feeling of the members of that corps in general, a belief which is warranted by the account which Mr. ALLEN gives of the conduct of Col. Wickham and his men, who appear to have been actuated by a deep feeling of *compassion* towards the misguided people, and not by that *love of fight* that is so visible in you. Indeed, it is almost impossible to believe, that a society of men of property, *embodied for the defence of their country against an enemy*, should not sorely lament the necessity of turning their arms against the breasts of their own countrymen and near neighbours. But *you*, who have the assurance to pretend to be their organ, and to proclaim their sentiments, really seem to be proud of the employ. What

man of a just way of thinking must not feel ashamed for his country on reflecting, that there is any necessity for employing armed men to keep the peace! Yet, so far from any such feeling appearing in your conduct, or language, you evidently contemplate the necessity with pleasure; and you tell me, and all others; that is to say, you tell the public, that you are *authorised* by the corps, to declare, that they are, *at all times, ready and willing and able*, to sally forth against unlawful mobs. This is an empty boast; an unfeeling threat; an irritating challenge; it is calculated to excite and keep alive divisions amongst the different classes of the people; to make those hate each other, who ought to be bound together by the ties of friendship; to dissolve the natural bonds of society; to produce bloodshed and civil war.

You are an ignorant man; vain of your military *gear*, your sash, your gorget, your plume, and your noisy words of command. A state of happiness and of tranquillity in the country, which would send you back to your trade or calling, would be regarded by you as the greatest of calamities. But, I can never believe, that this is the case with the *majority* of the Yeomen of the County of Somerset, which has produced so many hardy and brave men. *They* armed themselves and mounted their horses in the full persuasion, that their help was necessary *to the defence of England against France*. They never enrolled themselves for any other purpose; and, though there may have been a necessity for their employing their arms against Englishmen, I venture to say, that a very great majority of them have always viewed that necessity with sorrow and with shame; and, that they would now most gladly see the return of those days, when the constable's staff was amply sufficient for the protection of property, the preservation of the peace, or for the enforcing of the law on offenders.

In your letter to Mr. ALLEN, you talk of *traitors* and *firebrands* and of *enemies of the Constitution*. This is always the language of those, who are the real enemies of that Constitution. You are too ignorant a man to know the meaning of these words; or you would know, that the Constitution of England knows of no such thing as permanent military authority within the realm. That Constitution

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has provided Lords Lieutenants, Sheriffs, Justices of the Peace, Constables, and other *peace* officers. To these the Constitution has committed the peace of the several counties. And, though a *necessity* may have arisen to resort to military aid, it is a lamentable necessity, and a circumstance the existence of which every good man must deplore. But, to lament over this state of things is not all that we are entitled to do. We have a right to enquire into the *causes* of it, whether immediate or remote. And we have the further right to shew, if we can, how this great and disgraceful evil *might have been obviated*, and *to blame* those who have had the management of the nation's affairs for many years past. However base you may be, you are hardly so impudent as to deny that we possess these rights. Yet, it is for nothing but for the exercising of these rights in a small degree that you call people *traitors*!

Your ignorance and your manifestly unfeeling disposition, together, most likely, with some view of gain from your military occupation and zeal, deprive you of the power of seeing this matter in its true light. But, I will venture to say, that, if a majority of those whom you have the effrontery to pretend to represent, have not already perceived the source of our calamities, they will not long remain blind to them. They have been deceived; but the last hour of deception is fast approaching. They were led to believe, that the war was a war of justice and necessity; that it was just to make war against the people of France, and that the safety of England required it; that the war, if successful, would not re-introduce despotism and persecution on the Continent, and that it would infallibly secure the freedom, tranquillity, and happiness of their own country. They were led to believe, that their sacrifices, though great, would be compensated by success, or that, at any rate, they would *end with the war*. They have now seen the end of the war. They have rejoiced at the success of the war: but, *do they find, that their sacrifices are at an end?* Do they find, that safety, tranquillity, ease and happiness have been the fruit of the long, devastating and bloody struggle? Nay, though the columns of victory are decreed, is there a man of the Somerset Yeomanry who sincerely believes, *that*

*the struggle is yet at an end?* Will not every man of them confess that he has been grievously deceived? And will any one of them, except you, be so unjust and so base as to calumniate those, who, for many years, have been warning him against that deception?

Did the Somerset Yeomanry, when they took up arms, think that they were sallying forth in the cause of the *Bourbons* and their Government, a Dynasty and a species of sway held, for ages upon ages, in detestation by Englishmen? I will not bid *you* look through the shelves of a *library*, the contents of which would be about as useful to your horse as to yourself; but, let me ask any other member of the Corps, whether every book in our language, treating of government and of rulers, previous to the French Revolution, does not inculcate an abhorrence of the *Bourbons* and of their despotism? Whether we look into books on politics or religion; whether we read poems or plays or romances or real histories; nay, if we recur to very school-books, do we not find that this family and their government, were always held up to us as objects of hatred, and the French people as objects of contempt for having so long submitted to them? I will venture to say, that more than a thousand volumes have been written in the English language, exhibiting to the world the despotism, the cruelties and the various infamies of the Bourbon family and government. The state of oppression and of degradation; the abject slavery; the beastly vassalage of the French people; the scourged, tormented, insulted, French people; these were the eternal topics of the speeches in our Parliament, of our histories, poems, plays, novels and songs. There is no man except yourself, belonging to the Somerset Yeomanry Cavalry, who will deny this, or any part of it. And am I to believe, then, that there is any other man in that corps besides yourself, who rejoices at the restoration of the Bourbon family and government? I must not be told that these infamies existed in *ancient times*, and that they did not exist at the time when the French people threw off the yoke of their tyrants; for Mr Arthur Young, who made an actual and minute survey of the whole of the kingdom of France, during the very year that the Revolution broke out, has proved to us that this dreadful despotism



existed then in its full force. Does it, therefore, give the Yeomen of Somersetshire pleasure to reflect, that the immense sacrifices which they have made have assisted in the restoration of that family and their government, together with all their hordes of priests and petty feudal despots?

We have been told that we were fighting for *our religion*. Our religion, that religion, the clergy of which are supported by a tenth part of the produce of the earth; that religion teaches us that the religion of the Bourbons and their priests is erroneous, idolatrous, and *damnable*. And, do the Members of the Corps of Somerset Yeomanry Cavalry exult in the thought of having made enormous sacrifices, the tendency of which have been to cram this idolatrous worship down the throats of the people of France, and again to subject that people to the persecutions and the frauds of those same priests who formerly cheated and persecuted them? For twenty years, and more than twenty years while the Bourbons were absent from France, while they were in that exile into which the hatred of the nation had driven them, France was free from religious persecution. But, scarcely had we restored the Bourbons, when the blood of the protestants again began to flow, and not many months have passed over our heads, since it was proved in the House of Commons, that thousands of these people have perished under the worst torments that the most execrable of men could invent; which, however, is not at all surprizing, seeing that the throne of the Bourbons has never been for one half century unstained with Protestant blood. Is there, then, one single member of the Somerset Yeomanry Cavalry except yourself, who will pretend that he has zeal for our religion, while he rejoices at the restoration of the Bourbons?

But, it is not in France only that the sacrifices, made by the people of England, have tended to the restoration of tyranny and of persecution. There is not a man of us, who is forty years of age, who has not a thousand times, been taught by our clergy, that the Pope is anti-christ. To inculcate in our minds an abhorrence of this Man of Sin, this Beast of the Revelations, this Scarlet Whore of Babylon, whose garments are dipped in the blood of the Saints; to inculcate in our minds,

to implant there an implacable hatred of the very name of this Potentate, has been a principal object, not only of our Clergy, but of our Government, in all its branches, down to the very Church-Wardens and Overseers, who to this very hour, in many parts of the kingdom, assist, on the fifth of November, in committing Guy Fawkes to the flames, together with his two supporters, the Pope and the Devil. Can any member of the Somerset Yeomanry Cavalry then, except yourself, be so vile, so lost to all sense of shame, so depraved, so in love with every thing that is odious in point of character as to say that he is perfectly satisfied, that the sacrifices which he has made have had a tendency to restore the Pope to his throne and to his power?

If there was one particular thing in the world more detestable, more horrible, than any other thing, or than all other things put together, each of them being execrable and horrible; if there was any one thing which appeared thus in the eyes of Englishmen, it certainly was the *Inquisition*, which had in it every thing that we can conceive as likely to proceed from the instigation of hellish beings. It may, possibly, give *you* pleasure to reflect that the Inquisition is restored; but, I am very much mistaken if there be one single man besides yourself, belonging to the Somerset Yeomanry Cavalry, who could see a poor Protestant tied to the top of a post twenty feet high, while an execrable monk thrust a flaming faggot in his face from the end of a pole, and while other monsters of the same description lighted up a fire beneath him; I am much mistaken, I say, if any Member of the Somerset Yeomanry Cavalry except yourself could behold this spectacle, and reflect with satisfaction, that the sacrifices of himself and his family had tended to the renewal of such scenes after they had been abolished by Napoleon.

However, if there be any Members of the Somerset Yeomanry Cavalry besides yourself, who rejoice in these effects of the sacrifices which they have been making; who can indulge in cowardly exultation over the brave though now captive friend of religious freedom; who can feel pleasure to think of the torrents of blood of valiant men now shedding in France; who can coolly and quietly enjoy the sufferings of renovated slavery in a great and





populous nation: if there be any such persons as these, except yourself, in the Somerset Yeomanry Cavalry, I do assure them that I have heart-felt satisfaction in reflecting on what they and theirs do suffer and will suffer in consequence of the late war; for, certain I am, that it is suffering, and suffering alone that can inspire such minds with the smallest degree of justice or compassion.

It is perfectly useless for you to call the people a *mob*, as you have done in your letter, and to express your *readiness* and *willingness* to sally forth against them. The abusive words that you make use of will not remove the cause of the ferment that exists. To hear you one would imagine that the government had an enemy somewhere in the country, which it was at war with, and that you, brave man, were eager to come to blows with him. The greater part of the members of your corps, view the matter, I am quite sure, in a very different light. They know that those whom you call *mob*, though poor, are their neighbours. They know, that if they were to kill them all, they themselves must become miserable wretches. They see clearly enough that the commotions arise from the wants of the people; that those wants proceed from a deficiency in the means of support; that that deficiency is occasioned by a diminution in the means of the employers; that that diminution is the effect of the heavy demands of the government; and that the principal cause of those demands is, the burthen created by the late war. Hence, when they are called forth to draw their swords for the preservation of the peace, they are naturally and inevitably led to reflect upon the chain of causes and effects which have terminated in these scenes, and, so reflecting, they are taught lessons of wisdom, which, in the end, will, I trust, be found not to have been thrown away.

You are very fond of talking of *traitors* and *fire-brands* and of *seditious language*; but, who is it that has now depicted the miserable state of this country? Who has described whole parishes as having been deserted by the cultivators of the land? Who has described the paupers as issuing forth like banditti, and prowling the country in search of plunder? Who has declared that the progress of pauperism, if not speedily checked, will involve all

classes of the people in one general ruin? Who has hatched projects for the establishment of banks to save the pennies of the poor? Who has proposed to new-model the whole code of Poor Laws and to establish a Jurisdiction of Parochial Committees, to consist partly of labourers and partly of their employers? Who has broached the project for a general invasion of the property of the Church? Who has talked of tythes as a hardship, a burthen, an oppression, a nuisance? Who has hatched the scheme for sweeping away the sports and the charm of the country by making *game saleable* like chickens or ducks? Can you show me any Jacobin; any one of those, whom you have the audacity to call traitors, that has been the hatcher of any of these projects, almost any one of which, if carried into effect, would amount to something very nearly resembling a Revolution, and a Revolution, too, of a much more desisive character than that of 1688? No, the Jacobins, as far as I know any thing of them, are no *schemers*, no *projectors*: they want to make no changes other than those which are well known to the established laws of England. They are well satisfied that the poor man's lot will not be rendered better by any law which shall enable a gentleman to carry his hares and his pheasants to market. They can see no benefit to be derived from a farmer's paying into a Saving Bank through the hands of a labourer. They can see nothing but up-roar and confusion as likely to arise from any remedy other than that of a *great diminution of taxation*; and this is a measure which they most strenuously recommend as a proper subject of petitions from every class of the community, notwithstanding they foresee, that, by men like you, they will always be exposed to false and infamous accusations.

I have now, Sir, done with you for the present; but, as I have the pen in hand, I will here offer a hint or two to the Somerset Yeomanry, suggested by the observations of your fellow-labourer of the COURIER, who has kindly pointed out to the occupiers of the land how they may *find employment for the poor*. The charge which this man has brought against the *landlords* is well known. He is now *setting the poor against their employers*. Any body may be accused, it seems, *except the government*. We are to con-



vince the people that *no blame* is to be imputed to the government; but, we are, at the same time, to tell the poor, that the occupiers of the land *are able* to find them employment. Of course, if they do not do it, the *fault is theirs*. Let the Yeoman look to this.

"Nothing," says he, "can be more reprehensible than attempts to inflame and irritate at the present moment. It is the duty of all to soothe, not to inflame; and, whilst we deplore the sufferings to which any classes may be exposed, to convince them that *no blame is to be imputed to Government*; that their sufferings *are likely to be temporary*, but that they may be rendered permanent *by their listening to inflammatory publications*, and having recourse to acts of outrage. It is to be presumed that the officers of every parish in the different counties will exert themselves by inquiring into the *real situation* of all who claim relief; and, wherever they are found in positive distress, that they will do all that lies in their power to alleviate, if they cannot completely relieve it, both by *finding* them some sort of employment, as well as food. Much might be done by parishes *putting their roads into the best possible state of repair*; and various employments might be suggested for those poor persons who would prefer the earnings of honest labour to immediate parish relief. The approaching harvest will find employment for many thousands; but it would be well to *mature plans to succeed the harvest*, if, unfortunately, the commercial current should not have changed by that time. October and November would be *proper months for repairing the roads*, and although it would be hard upon the parishes to *pay more to the highway rates*, yet when the roads were once *well repaired and widened*, they would find their account in after years. In every possible way *employment should be invented* for those who, as we have before said, are ready and willing to work."

Let the Yeomanry look to this, which is not a very indirect mode of instigating to acts of violence. For my part, if I were to endeavour to make the people believe that no blame is to be imputed to the government, I should be a very great hypocrite as well as a very inconsistent

man, having for the last ten years, been convinced, that the war would end in producing those very sufferings which it has produced, and knowing very well that that war is to be imputed to the government, whom I have a thousand times warned of these very consequences. I should be equally unfortunate, were I to endeavour to persuade the people that their sufferings *are likely to be temporary*; or, rather, I should be equally insincere and base, being thoroughly convinced that their sufferings will be permanent, unless the government relax very much indeed on the score of taxation. No, it is not in my power to convince men of the truth of that which is false, nor is it my wish so to do.

But, the serious part of this article is, the insinuation, that it is in the power of Parish Officers to *find employment* for the poor. Easy, very easy indeed, is it, for them to find the poor employment; but very difficult to find them *pay* for that employment. The game at *push-pin* is an employment. *Throwing stones against the wind* is also a pretty enough sort of employment; but who is to *pay*, pay for these pretty employments? It is the means of paying for the employment, and not the employment itself which is so scarce, and that the Yeomanry of Somersetshire know full as well as we do in Hampshire.

This wise-acre has, however, found out an employment himself for our poor.—Much might be done, he says, by our *putting of our roads in the best possible state of repair*, and he is kind enough to give us the information, that November is a very proper month for this work! So that, he thinks we have got money to lay out upon the repair of roads; plenty of money for *that*, though we have none to expend in the improvement of our own private property! Your friend the Courier, Mr. THORNHILL, appears to be pretty nearly as wise a man as you, and as staunch a friend of the Yeomanry. But supposing us to look upon November a pleasant month for repairing and widening our highways, who can come to us without a new act of Parliament to justify us in raising money for that purpose, beyond the nine-pence in a pound for one year? This man, before he talked upon a subject like this, ought to have known that the law provides for the repairing of the highway



by duty performed in kind, and by a rate which is not to extend above ninepence in the pound. The highways are not repaired out of the poor-rates, and there can be no question that it is illegal in any parish officer to employ paupers upon the highways to an amount beyond what the law allows, and what the surveyor of the highways agrees to pay, which must be a sum within the amount of the rate specified within the act.

Absurd, however, as these notions are; downright nonsense as it is to suppose that we shall be able to find money to do extra work upon the roads, when we are unable to pay for work, which we want to have done for ourselves for our own private benefit; stupid as it is to expect, that, when we cannot find money to pay for the draining and cleaning of our lands, we shall be able to find money to pay for the mending and beautifying of our highways; contemptible as all this is, still it shows to what shifts and tricks these government writers are driven, and with what alarms they are haunted. We are to *invent* employment, it seems; *various employments*, we are told, might be suggested. Thank you, good taylor Stuart. And why cannot you find some employmen, for our people in your old trade of stitching cloth together, or in your new trade of stitching sentences together? If, indeed, you could put them in the way of launching forth an "*Eclair*" now and then, it might tend very much to their comfort and to ours too. As you have succeeded so well by these sorts of inventions, pray put on your inventing cap and invent a little for us in this hour of our distress; but always bear in mind, that it is the means of *finding money* which we want you to invent, and not the means of finding employment, wherein we stand in no need of any assistance at all.

If the Yeomanry Cavalry of Somersetshire will but pay a little attention to these workings of the Courier, they will, I think, derive some little benefit from the correspondence between you and me, and will, perhaps, be the more disposed to find an apology for my having, a second time, done you an honour, which, on your own account, you so little deserve.

WM. COBBETT.

TO MR. COBBETT.

Paris, Feb. 3, 1816.

SIR,—It is only a few days, since I saw in the Register of Nov. 4th, 1815, your remarks on my "Observations to the Letters to Lord Sheffield." I should have regretted that I had not seen them sooner, had they contained any thing that threatened to overturn the financial principles which I have advanced in my three letters in your Register, and generally in my other political writings. This, however, is far from being the case—and as you do not attempt to controvert, I must suppose that you find them altogether unassailable. Had my economical opinions been false, they would have been easily refuted, and it was your duty, as, I doubt not, you would have felt the inclination, to do it. But if you do not object to my financial doctrines in general, and to what I have advanced, respecting the nature and cause of the distress under which the country is at present labouring, you have made pretty free with what I have proposed as the remedy for our maladies; or, with my "*Nostrum*" as you are pleased to call it. You have tried it more, however, by the test of ridicule, than that of reason, though it might have been as well had you preferred the latter mode of assay to the former.

But, Sir, in your hurry to attack me on this point, (the remedy I proposed) you forgot completely to defend yourself; you forgot that I had carried all your positions, and forced even your last entrenchment—in other words, that I had overturned all the arguments you had advanced respecting the *cause* (which *you* said was "*taxation and taxation only*,") of the distress of the farmer, and ruin of agriculture. In defence of your opinions on this point, *you have not said a single word*. I must conclude, therefore, that it was not in your power to do it; and though you seem to consider me a mere quack in political medicine, I might venture to challenge, not only you, but all the duly dubbed state doctors into the bargain, to maintain *your* thesis. If I had contented myself with shewing that *you* were entirely mistaken, with respect to the cause of the sufferings of the farmer—if I had not been so "*unfortunate*," as you term it, as to say, "*that I would point out an effectual remedy for the dis-*



tresses of agriculture and trade," it appears that you would scarcely have been "fortunate" enough to have had the means of making any reply to me, or any defence for yourself. If I had not given you this handle, I should have been "*teres ubique rotundus*"—you would not have been able even to lay hold of me.

But you must recollect, Sir, *if* I have failed in fulfilling this promise, of which we will say more by and by, that it was entirely a work of supererogation on my part, if I succeeded in shewing, which I flatter myself I have, that you, and not you only, but the whole college of state physicians also, had mistaken the nature of your patients' complaint; that what you considered to be a case of consumption was, in reality, rather one of plethora,\* it was enough, and more than enough, for me to do. I might have left it to the regular state doctors—to the writers of Registers, and of Monthly, Critical, and Edinburgh Reviews, &c. &c. to have prescribed for the disease, when they could bring themselves to agree upon the proper remedy for it.

The "foetid hospital," you say, "is the natural element of quacks;" believe me, it is that, also, of the regular medical practitioner; and you, I find, who, no doubt, are furnished with the usual paraphernalia of the profession, a gold-headed cane, big wig, and regular diploma, are about to set a foot in it. You promise, I see, in the Register from which I have quoted, to offer us *your* remedy—*your* "*nostrum*;" I certainly am rather anxious to see what this remedy of your's is, and should have had great confidence in its efficacy, did you not appear to me to have utterly mistaken, as I have just observed, your patients' case. The fact is, Sir, that, instead of setting out with a close and attentive investigation of your subject, you set out with *taking it for granted*, that the country *must* necessarily be weakened by the bloody and expensive war in which it has been so long engaged. I grant that

it *might* have been much more advanced in cultivation and wealth, had we been at peace all the time, instead of being at war. But, Sir, is it not *possible* that a country may carry on an expensive war, and go on, at the same time, improving *more or less*?—has it not been the case with ourselves?—is not the country improved in its agriculture and manufactures, and has not its population been increased within the last 25 years? *The wealth of a country is determined by the amount of the annual produce of its soil, and manufacturing industry.* The *whole* of this produce is, on the average, *annually* consumed, *whether it be at peace or at war.* If the annual produce of a country were not annually consumed, *whether in peace or in war, IT WOULD NOT BE ANNUALLY PRODUCED.* Because, whatever is annually produced in a nation, is produced to be annually sold; and, whatever is bought, is bought to be, in general, *immediately* used. If things are bought, it is because they are wanted to be used; and if they were *not* bought, they could not be sold, and would, therefore, never be produced. Nations do not, on the average, lay by any thing, in the manner that individuals do. Nations could only become rich, after the manner of individuals, by lending money to *other* countries, or by purchasing land in them. *If, therefore, the amount of the annual general produce of any country go on increasing, it is evident that that country goes on improving, whether it be at peace or at war; and, if it be at war, that it makes no greater effort or expenditure, not only than it is able to bear, but even to improve under.* Any effect which the *manner* by which the expence of carrying on a war, if a nation be at war, is raised, whether by a direct levy at the time, for the whole sum, on the whole body of the people, or by taking the money from one part of them, and making the other part pay them interest for it—since it does not lessen, since, in short, it makes no difference in the actual amount of the annual national produce, can make no difference in the amount of its actual wealth. It will only affect the annual *distribution* of that wealth, or the manner in which the annual produce of the country is divided among its inhabitants; nor will it affect the interests of the labouring, or trading and agricultural classes, so far, at least, as the latter live

\* If abundance of men and provisions be any criterion of the health and strength of a state, the country can scarcely be said to have been in a consumption, at the conclusion of the late war, though it may be now almost in one from mismanagement.



by agriculture or trade. This, at least, is my opinion, an opinion which I have already advanced, and endeavoured to prove in your Register, and as you have not even attempted to refute it, you must permit me still to retain it.

But it will be said, if the country was not exhausted or injured by the war, what is the reason of its decline, now that it is at peace? To this I reply, that it is owing entirely to the *cessation* of the war, to our having had great crops two years together, and our not knowing how to counteract the consequences which such a combination of circumstances is calculated to have on agriculture. But to be satisfied that the country was not exhausted by the war, let us ask ourselves what are the symptoms of the decline and exhaustion of a country? Are we not to look for them in its deserted villages, decaying towns, depopulated cities, neglected agriculture, and declining manufactures? But, Sir, did the country, at the *conclusion* of the late war, exhibit any such symptoms? Did it not possess, on the contrary, an increased and increasing population? Were not its manufactures and commerce reviving, in proportion as the power of Bonaparte declined? Had it not a highly flourishing agriculture, and the prospect, which was realised, of a greater crop than it ever, perhaps, before had to boast of since it was a nation? The country, then, was *not* exhausted *by* the war: it had not even been weakened by it. On the contrary, compared with what it ever was before, it had strengthened and improved itself in every respect in *spite* of it. And may we not venture to say, Sir, that agriculture and manufactures would both have continued to prosper, if the war had continued, and especially if we had not had quite so great a crop as we had last year, unless we knew how to deal with a great crop better than we appear to do? Yes, Sir, had we at present a good hearty corn-consuming Peninsular war and plenty of Government Contractors every Market-day in Mark-lane—Agriculture would flourish as before, and grain fetch as high a price as ever. The cannon foundries, the gun and sword manufactories, the contractors for army and navy clothing, and the manufactories for supplying them would be still on the alert. Your friend, the

Whitechurch farmer, instead of getting twenty only would have got thirty-nine shillings a head for his sheep as usual; Mr. Portal's paper-money manufacturing mill would have been as busy as before; the zeal and loyalty of the farmer's sons would have been as conspicuous as ever, their antipathy to reformers would have been as violent as ever, and their helmets and other military accoutrements as glittering and well furbished. But it does not follow from this that it is *necessary* that a nation should be at war in order to be prosperous, or that it may be placed in circumstances in which war at any time can possibly be more advantageous to it than peace, provided its affairs are properly managed. To maintain the contrary would be as ridiculous as to assert that the affairs of individuals will, in some circumstances, go on better when they spend their money in law suits and their time in quarrelling instead of minding their business. Nor is it true that an abundant crop must *necessarily* occasion the decay and ruin of agriculture. We may as well say that an individual farmer must *necessarily* be ruined by a good crop, as that a nation must. We may rest assured, that if a favourable crop prove *at any time* injurious to a country\*—it is because there is something radically wrong in its poli-

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\* It would be laughable enough, if the subject was not of too serious a nature, to see the whole college of state doctors, just after the cessation of a war, and after a most abundant crop, in short, immediately after the return of "peace and plenty," shaking their heads and crying out, "we are in a dreadful plight—things are quite out of joint—*something must be done.*" Pray Gentlemen, what would you say if things were the reverse of all this—if we were engaged in an expensive war—if the country was half depopulated, and instead of almost a double we had just got in scarcely half a crop and were threatened with famine—I suppose that in this case we should have you hugging yourselves for joy—and singing out "all's well"—there's nothing needs be done—things are going on swimmingly—and just as they should do!! Do not you really think, Gentlemen, you are somehow or other mistaken? Is there not some radical and capital error which affects the whole of your system of political and state medicine?



tical institutions, or else it is occasioned by a general ignorance of the principles of population, and the relative amount of the demand for grain and of its supply, and our not being aware, at the same time, of the effect which the *equality of consumption*, and the inequality of produce, and the other physical phenomena to which the culture of grain is subject, must necessarily have on its price and of course on the general interests of agriculture. But we shall probably find, before we have done, that it is entirely owing to the last of these circumstances that our agriculture is at present declining, and the farmer reduced to distress and sinking to ruin. In your letters to Lord Sheffield you said that it was "taxation, and *taxation only*" which occasioned the ruin of the farmer—but in Letter I. to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (November 4), you appear to have altered your opinion, you seem to think now that it is the lessening of the discounts at the Bank which is the principle cause of it. In my next I shall examine your opinions on this head; and then proceed to shew that the "Remedy," which I proposed in my last, is both rational, practicable, and effectual; in short, that without it, or something like it, we must either have recourse to "public granaries," as I hinted in my last, or that the physical circumstances which affect the growth of grain and render its annual produce *necessarily irregular and unequal*, combined with the *necessary regularity and equality of its consumption*, are such that agriculture must from time *necessarily* decline and languish in the manner it is doing at present, whatever be the circumstances in which the country finds itself in other respects, and especially if it be at peace.

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#### ANOTHER WAR.

#### THE NEW CRUSADE.

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The London Prints inform us of active preparations for a new crusade against the States of Barbary.

We are told of the wonderful alertness of our Ministers in fitting out an armament

for the invasion of Algiers, and this enterprise is spoken of as a matter which should obtain the unqualified approval of every friend of humanity and civilized society.

The London Courier of last Monday, received this morning, informs us of the extensive preparations making for the outfit of Lord Exmouth's Expedition.

Ten ships of war, besides bombs, with Congreve rockets, Shrapnell shells, and other destructive implements of war, are in readiness. The ships are getting ready with all possible expedition; and a bounty, of two months' wages, is offered, as an inducement to sailors to join in the Expedition.—This bounty to be paid on their return home; which the Courier calculates will be in a few months.

This Paper further informs us, that a vast number of officers have tendered their services, as volunteers, to serve in gunboats, or in any other manner that Lord Exmouth may direct.

So, then, here we find ourselves engaged in a new crusade, and at the opening of a new war.

To secure the public sanction, we are further assured, that no doubt can exist of the success of the enterprise; and, thus, every incentive which can animate the human heart to sympathy, or the human hand to action, is put in requisition for the advancement of this Expedition.

It does not, however, appear as yet, that our exertions are to be aided by any member of the Continental alliance; and it is not the least surprising circumstance, that the "Holy and Christian League," of the North, appears to keep aloof from any connexion with this crusade.

We are aware of the popularity of this design. It is natural that people who have nothing to do, and consequently little to eat, should feel anxious to catch at business or employment of any kind. This class of persons rejoices at the prospects of a new war, upon any terms, or with any Power; because they look forward to occupation and emolument; and, in the same spirit of pecuniary calculation, the friends and relatives, who are burthened by those drones, would gladly approve of any change, which would relieve them from such incumbrances.

But these are not the only persons who participate in the sentiments of approval,



which we hear announced, whenever and wherever this new crusade is spoken of.

Many, very many, imagine that they are bound by a sense of religious and moral duty, to unite in the outcry against the inhabitants of Barbary and their Governments; and, indeed, the very word Pirate, and the sentiments associated with it, are sufficient to awake the animosities, and excite the execrations of all tender hearted men and women, who do not take the trouble of penetrating below the surface, into the matter.

As to the Press, as well of the Continent as of these islands, they are violently clamorous for the chastisement of the people of Barbary; in this sentiment they are unanimous; indeed, so completely so, that we do not know a single exception to the general rule. They are only vexed, because the pirates are not already massacred, and the entire country depopulated and laid waste. They think too much time has been lost in executing such holy work; and their only solace seems to rest in their expectation that when the enterprise is completely outfitted, the consummation will be most satisfactory to their hopes and wishes.

With such portentous indications before us, so numerous and so various, it may appear a strange and hazardous undertaking to question the justice of such policy, or to refuse an assent to doctrines so generally recognised.

It may be esteemed a symptom of inhuman feelings, to refuse an approving voice or to withhold an expression of sympathy with that violent ardour which applauds the projected crusade.

Strange, however, as it might appear, and reluctant as we would feel to oppose our single negative to any measure, generally approved by public opinion; nevertheless, our sense of truth and attachment to sincerity prevail over all other considerations; and, therefore, in that spirit of truth and sincerity, we avow our total unqualified disapproval of the projected crusade. We trust our countrymen will allow us to assume, that our claims to an equal portion of humanity with any other members of society must be admitted; we anticipate that the people of Ireland will not readily impute to the conductors of the *Dublin Chronicle* any brutal or barbarous propensities, and that should they

still continue to differ from us, after the fair and full disclosure of our sentiments and principles, they will nevertheless be more disposed to attribute our dissent to the imperfection of judgment, than to any evil inclination of disposition.

We object to this Crusade for two reasons.

1st, Because it is not proved to be necessary or just.

2dly, Because, even admitting its necessity and its justice, we do not think it is likely to be successful.

If we succeed in proving either of these positions, we are entitled to the favourable judgment of our countrymen; which is all we desire; and as to those politicians, who are at all times well disposed towards ridding our country of its superabundant population, we set no value on their opinions, one way or other. Let us first see what is the ostensible cause of war, and then examine whether it is sufficient, according to the existing laws of war, so far as they can be collected from the conduct of the existing Governments, always holding in view the paramount obligations of humanity.

To examine this important subject with any view or hope of rational inquiry, we must get rid of all obnoxious and irritating names; one must judge by acts, not by imputations. We must, therefore, put out of consideration altogether those odious names of pirates, and barbarians, and infidels, and confine ourselves to the simple considerations, whether the acts of the persons to whom such epithets are applied, are so dissimilar from, or so opposite to, the acts of the people and governments which arraign them, as to justify those people or governments in making such complaints without violation of consistency.

It appears, that a pacific treaty was entered into a short time since between the Algerine Government and His Britannic Majesty, who was represented by Lord Exmouth.

It appears further, that on the 23d of May, the crews of a number of fishing boats landed at Bona, for the purpose of attending prayers; that they were attacked by a large body of Turkish troops, who entered the Church and massacred about two hundred persons. It is added in the private accounts, and it is very strange



that no official report has been published, that those Turks revolted, and that the Governor endeavoured, but in vain, to prevent the massacre.

This is the sum of the mischievous outrage, and very mischievous indeed it is; but though we feel as sensibly as any others can, the extent of this atrocity; nevertheless, we do not find in this commotion any sufficient cause for immediate war.

It will not be permitted to the war advocates to look for a cause of war in any acts of the Algerine Government preceding the late treaty; nor will it be sufficient to maintain, or to allege, that those States hold no regard for treaties.—This country should be involved in perpetual war with all the States of Europe, if it were allowable to search back for causes of hostility to their former relations of enmity. Within the last ten years, we have been at war with all the people of the world: turn about—we have carried our hostilities into every quarter of Europe—we invaded several nations, and inflicted most cruel severities upon them—we attacked Copenhagen, demolished its buildings, and destroyed its inhabitants—we had previously attacked South America, plundered and put to the sword several thousands of the inhabitants of that country—we invaded America, burned its capital, desolated its villages, and destroyed thousands of its inhabitants—we appeared again in the East, invading the territories of the legitimate King of Candy, destroying his subjects, and deposing himself. Thus, in the North and the South, the East and the West, the British arms have been engaged in aggressive warfare within the short space of ten or twelve years; we have been in a state of warfare with Russia, Prussia, France, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Saxony, Spain, Portugal, Italy, &c. &c. in Europe, with America, North and South, and in several quarters of Asia and Africa.

Now, if it should be considered just and reasonable for us to search for a cause of war with the Algerine Government in any or all of their acts preceding the late treaty; it would be fully as just and reasonable for any of those nations we have named, or all of them, to make war upon us, and refer to the former state of hostilities as the cause of a new war.

In truth, all the nations of the earth should be engaged in a constant state of war against us, if this principle was not to be permitted to stand good.

Now, as to the habitual disregard of treaties imputed to the Algerine Government, our feeling is, that the imputation does not appear to be sustained by facts.

We do not mean to say that they have not violated treaties; but what we maintain is, that the Algerine Government has not evinced such a peculiar or particular disregard of treaties beyond other governments, that its inconstancy should be considered a just cause for aggression.

Let any man turn back his thoughts to the history of Europe, for the last twenty years, and he will find that there has been a constant and habitual disregard of treaties visible in the acts of every Government thereof. How often have we been engaged with other nations, alternately in a state of war and peace! The magnanimous Alexander can testify the instability of our treaties; so can the Emperor of Austria, as we changed from peace to war, and from war to peace with them, four or five times within the short space of time alluded to. So that it does not appear that the Algerine Government evinces any peculiar disregard of treaties more than the Governments of Europe; and therefore there is no real cause of war sustained by that imputation of infidelity or perfidy.

Besides, if the breach of a former treaty was to constitute sufficient ground for perpetual hostility, the Catholics of Ireland should be engaged in a state of constant war against the successors of King William, for his perfidious violation of the solemn Treaty of Limerick; an act of perfidy, which produced more plunder and persecution than ever was resorted to by the Algerine States, since their first establishment down to the present moment. So that it would be not only an unjust, but an unwise principle, to make any alleged disregard of former treaties a cause of war against those States of Barbary.

But the great question is—if there exist such a constant and characteristic disregard of treaties with the Governments of those States, why did our Government enter into any treaty with them? Aye, why did they enter into a treaty with persons who should not be trusted, and



thus encourage a confidence which was not justified?

We believe that some people talk a great deal about this subject, without knowing, or thinking, or perhaps heeding much what it is they are talking about; provided they can stir up a new war, and make out some snug offices for themselves or their relatives. These talking folk never consider, that when they impeach the Algerine Government of perfidy, they at the same time impeach our own Government of ignorance, and inattention to the public interests.

We are not maintaining that the late treaty was a good one; but it was a treaty, and it is not as yet proved that the Algerine Government has so violated it as to furnish just cause of war, or rather to render a war necessary. We say necessary; for nothing short of absolute necessity would justify our Government in involving these countries in a new war, in the present time of general distress.

The truth is, that the British nation had been long in alliance with the Algerines.

In the latter end of the reign of Charles the 2d, an alliance was formed with those states, which subsisted, with occasional alterations, down to a very late period. This treaty was formally renewed and re-sanctioned by the British Government during the reigns of William the 3d, and George the 2d, the last of whom ratified all former treaties with the Algerines.

All these facts tend to shew the insufficiency of that cause of war which is so frequently alleged: for, if it was true, that perfidy is the characteristic of those nations, why were those treaties entered into?

That their system of Government is a very bad one, we readily admit; that many of their practices are monstrous and most cruel, we know; but, we deny that there is any thing either in their Government or in their practices, so much worse than the Government and the practices of other nations, that it should be esteemed of itself, a cause of war.

We must, as already stated, not be influenced by sounds or words, when discussing those subjects. We must look at the subject quietly, and discuss its merits dispassionately; and before we seek to take the beam out of our neighbour's eye, we should examine whether there is not a

larger one in our own, lest those pirates, barbarians, and infidels, as we call them, may retort, when the nations which claim civilization impeach their humanity or their fidelity. The Algerine might be tempted to retort upon the Spanish accuser, that his Government had broken faith with the people who established it, and imprisoned or banished more of its friends and supporters in a single year, than the Algerines captured of their enemies in half a century. And if he were to turn his thought to the conduct of the Spanish Government in South America, he could point out acts of atrocity much more barbarous than any or all committed by the Algerine States, within the memory of man.

But he need not stop there; surely the Spanish Government, which supports the trade in black slaves upon land, is as infamous as the Algerine Government, which supports the trade in white slaves upon sea; and yet the beloved Ferdinand is our faithful ally, while the perfidies and enormities of his Government excel, by an immeasurable excess, the atrocities of the Algerine States.

Look to France, and you will find its prisons crowded with pining captives, whose sufferings were produced by a disregard of treaties, and whose most faithful and most valiant countrymen have endured proscription, persecution, and death, on account of their confidence in the faith of treaties. This same France also maintains slavery, and, therefore, cannot complain of a State which varies only in the colour of its victims.

As a proof that this infamous traffic is not yet abandoned by the nations, claiming to be esteemed civilized, we need only refer to the London Courier of last Monday; which informs its readers that the Bann, of 20 guns, arrived on Friday at Portsmouth, from a cruise off the African coast; during which she captured the following vessels, illegally employed trading in slaves to the northward of the line, viz. Rosa, American schooner, with a cargo of two hundred and seventy-six slaves.

Temerario, Portuguese, fitted for carrying six hundred slaves; had forty of them actually embarked, being captured at the commencement of her traffic.

San Antonio, Portuguese brig, with six hundred slaves on board.



Nostra Senora del Carmen, Spanish schooner, with one hundred and fifty slaves.

Another Spanish Schooner, name not given, with four hundred slaves.

Mark—these are the captures of one single sloop—five ships, carrying off one thousand four hundred and sixty-six of our fellow-creatures in their piratical corsairs!!!

Here is abundant occupation for our Knights Crusaders. Surely the massacre at Bona is trifling when contrasted with this; and yet this is only a very trifling specimen of the trade; for it is a trade, a regular traffic. Let us begin here, if we must be crusaders.

If you go more to the North, surely it is not the Autocrat of Russia, or the despot of Prussia, or the confederated anti-popular alliance that should complain against Algerine barbarity, when their own system is purely tyrannical, and their every subject a slave.

If, again, the Algerine should seek to retort upon ourselves, would he not be tempted to search our history for proofs of an equality of guilt? For many years the principal traders in the brutal traffic of our fellow-men; and at this moment the most extensive slave-holders in the world. Nay, if he were to come nearer to head-quarters, what would he say to our Press-gangs and Orange-gangs? Might he not ask, in what do the practices of those Associations vary from those imputed to his Government? For ourselves we freely avow, that we consider the Orange ruffians, who infest this country, much more brutal and barbarous than any Barbary Pirates.—For, without any desire or expectation of advantage, but from sheer villainy, they persecute and murder their unoffending fellow-subjects; whereas, the Algerine Corsair makes his crime secondary to his profits, and never makes his fellow-subject the object of his cruelty.

It would appear, therefore, that the European Governments have not such an advantage over the States of Barbary, in point of fidelity or humanity, as would justify them in making the inferiority of those States in such qualifications, a cause of warlike aggression.

Really, when humanity is brought in as an auxiliary to this crusade, it becomes

its advocates to consider well what it is they recommend as a redress of the late massacre at Bona; for we think it is now pretty plain, that they must confine themselves to that single cause of hostilities, unless they expect, as we are satisfied they are inclined, to set all the nations of Europe at war with each other, for all past transgressions of the obligations of fidelity and humanity. For, we think we have made it appear very distinctly, that if former fidelity, or inconstancy, or inhumanity, is a just cause of war against those States; there is not a nation in Europe upon which they might not retort with severity, and with justice too.

It appears that 200 persons were massacred by some Turkish troops. A great crime unquestionably; but, then, what redress do our humanity-folk recommend? Why, that we should send out a fleet and army—endanger the lives of thousands of our fellow-subjects, and destroy the lives and properties of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children, however innocent of any share in the massacre, or however disposed to condemn and reprobate it.

This is humanity with a vengeance. Another specimen of our Copenhagen humanity is dearly desired by those tender-hearted crusaders. But the fact is, that people allow their senses to be carried away by the current of complaint, and don't stop to consider either the causes or the consequences of the war which they recommend.

They may, perhaps, think that the term "war" is misapplied here—that it will be only like a fracas at a fair—that it is only to say the word, and we have them down—that the Algerines won't fight—and that if they even should, still they have not sufficient strength to make such resistance as would justify us in designating the conflict by the word "war."—We shall see more of this by and bye.

It does not appear that any exertion has been made to obtain an explanation of this affair; and be it remembered, that as yet we have heard but one side of the story, and therefore it would be premature to determine that those Turkish troops who rose against the Christians did not receive any provocation or offence.

At all events, it appears, so far as we can ascertain, that the massacre was the



result of a "revolt," or an "insurrection" of the troops; and, therefore, the Government should not be held responsible for it at least until it should have either approved the act, or declined investigating the matter and punishing the offenders. This is but common justice.

Besides, it should not be forgotten that the governor endeavoured to prevent the massacre by all the force under his command, but failed in the effort; and this is another strong proof that the massacre was not promoted by the government.

The writer of this article has seen an English officer in a country town in this county, fail in an exertion to disperse a mob of Orange rioters; and it would be held unfair to attribute to him, or his government, those riots which he endeavoured to prevent. The same rule of judgment should decide favourably for the Governor of Bona and his employers. We condemn, as sincerely as the most clamorous crusader, the infamous outrage; and would rejoice to hear that the perpetrators were ascertained and chastised by their government, or even carried off by a plague, or swallowed up in an earthquake or punished in some way that would not require the destruction of innocent lives. For, if we were to invade Algiers, it is ten to one but the perpetrators of the massacre would get off much better than the innocent and unoffending women and children of the country, or our own fellow-subjects who would constitute the invading force. Thus our crusade would operate like our Polleen Code, punishing the innocent for the faults of the guilty.

The case, then, so far as the public are informed, is simply this:—

The troops of a foreign power revolted against the Governor of a city in the States of that Power, and, in defiance of his authority and command, massacred two hundred strangers. No explanation has been required from the Government of that Foreign State of this outrage, and consequently that Power has not refused to investigate the matter, and punish the offenders.

It is our decided opinion, that such a state of affairs does not furnish just cause of war against that Foreign Power; and particularly on the part of a country, already writhing in the agonies of dis-

tress, and despair, produced by previous warfare.

We wish our readers to keep their attention fixed to this single cause of war, and to recollect that they have no right to refer to any acts that occurred previous to the last treaty, concluded only a few days before the massacre took place; as that treaty was entered into with a view to all previously existing circumstances, and must be taken to have adjusted all affairs up to the date of its completion.

If it should appear thereafter that the Algerine Government, on being applied to for redress, would refuse it; then it would be right to consider what course should be adopted. But, as yet, no cause of war appears to us to exist; and, therefore, the people should not be involved in it.

We now proceed to the second ground of opposition to this crusade, viz.

That we do not expect it would succeed.

This would be a sufficient objection, even were we to admit the necessity and justice of the enterprise; for a war without hopes or prospects of success, could only lead to a wasteful, unprofitable expenditure of blood and treasure, and loss of honour and glory.

We draw our conclusions of the unpromising prospects of the proposed crusade, from a review of the distressed and impoverished state of this Empire, and of the fate of former wars against the same States.

It is not necessary for us to illustrate the poverty of the country, or its inadequacy to any great undertaking. Every object we behold reminds us of that melancholy fact, for the truth of which we are indebted to an inordinate military ambition.

In 1505, Cardinal Ximenes, Prime Minister of Ferdinand, sent the Count of Navarre with a powerful force to invade the country; they succeeded in taking the Capital, but were driven out again next year by the united forces of Barbarosa and Prince Entemi.

In the latter end of the summer of 1541, Charles V with a fleet of 120 ships and 20 galleys, and thirty thousand chosen troops, and attended by immense crowds of volunteers, appeared on the coast of Algiers. The army landed without oppo-



sition at a distance of about two leagues from the Capital; but were most dreadfully cut up in two or three days by the violence of a hurricane and the sallies of the Moorish army. It is calculated that more than three fourths of that numerous army were destroyed in the course of a week.

In 1542, the Spaniards again attacked Algiers with a considerable force commanded by Count D'Alcandela. The Algiers gave battle, and the Spaniards were defeated, with the loss of their brave commander, who was killed in action, the total rout of the Spanish army, and the captivity of ten thousand Spaniards, including the son of the Count, and many Noblemen and Gentlemen.

Early in the 17th century a fresh attack was made by the Spaniards under Admiral Doria, but it failed like the former ones.

In 1620 an English squadron, under the command of Admiral Sir Robert Mansel, attempted to set fire to the shipping in the harbour of Algiers, but returned without doing much damage.

Shortly after this the Algerine fleet was defeated by the Venetian Admiral Cappello; but this defeat only made the Algerines more desperate, and they soon became more powerful than ever.

Two French squadrons attacked Algiers at different times after, and although they succeeded in injuring the capital, as we did in destroying Washington in the last war, still they did not break the strength or spirit of the country.

To come, however, to the later periods, we find that in 1775 the Spaniards attacked Algiers by land and sea, with a force consisting of twenty thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, forty-seven king's ships, of different rates, and three hundred and forty-six transports. This immense force however was repulsed with great loss; as were two other invading armies in 1783 and 1784.

Nothing has occurred to diminish the resources of Algiers since those latter events took place; on the contrary, they have become much stronger, and there-

fore with such facts before our eyes, viewing as well such proofs of our own distresses, as of the former successes of those States, we cannot anticipate a successful issue for the proposed crusade; and, therefore, consider ourselves perfectly warranted even on such grounds, the simple calculation of probabilities, in resisting the projected war; for we believe it will not now be considered an improper application of that term (war,) after a review of the powerful resources which those States displayed on the occasions to which we have referred.

Our readers will recollect with what ease and confidence our war-men anticipated the immediate submission of America at the opening of the last war with that country. Let them beware, lest the ultimate results of this new war may disappoint them full as much, and lest they may meet another "New Orleans" in Algiers.

We should perhaps apologise to our readers for the length of these observations, but we candidly avow that we are sensible of the singularity of our opinions on this subject; and fear that we may incur some share of unpopularity on account of them; at least, until our reasons and principles are well ascertained and considered.

We, therefore ventured to enter largely, though hastily, into the consideration of the merits of the proposed crusade, and to state fully and fairly our objections to it.

These objections are now before our countrymen, and will, we trust, be considered sufficient for our justification, if not for their satisfaction.

We feel an abhorrence to war, we consider it the greatest curse that can befall a people, and particularly a people situated as we are at present, sinking under public and private distresses. We, therefore, oppose this new war; and the more earnestly because there does not appear any sufficient cause to provoke it, or any prospect of its success.